Computational psychiatry attempts to apply mathematical and computational techniques to help improve psychiatric care. Here, we consider formal valuation accounts of emotion. The flexibility of emotional responses and the nature of appraisals suggest the need for a modelbased framework for emotions. Resource limitations make plain model-based valuation impossible, and require strategies to apportion cognitive resources adaptively. We argue that emotions can implement such approximations by restricting the range of behaviours and states considered. We consider the processes that guide the deployment of the emotional approximations, discerning between innate, model-free, heuristic and model-based controllers. A focus on complex model-based decisions reveals the necessity for strategies to deal with the complexity of the problems. Emotions may provide such approximations, and this framework may provide a principled approach to examining them.
Introduction
Computational psychiatry is a young field hoping to leverage advances in computational techniques to understand and improve mental health (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) . It is motivated, on the one hand, by the necessity to bring novel statistical and machine-learning techniques to bear on the rapidly expanding complexity of novel datasets relevant to mental health, and on the other M A N U S C R I P T
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2 hand by the complexity of the problem itself as mental health relates to the most difficult tasks performed by the most complex of organs.
Emotions are central to mental health, and emotional disorders contribute substantially to the burden of mental illnesses (6 ) . The traditional dichotomization of emotion and reason might question the feasibility of applying computational techniques to the core issues of emotion. It is therefore imperative for computational psychiatry that we consider the ability of a computational and mathematical framework to address core emotional phenomena. Here, we argue that approaching emotion computationally requires the introduction of model-based valuation and metareasoning. Metareasoning considers optimal valuation in the face of resource constraints (7, 8, 9) . The proposal is that human emotions involve strategies to deal with the complexity of model-based or goal-directed decision-making by focusing on particular aspects of the problem at hand.
Research on human emotions is complicated as questions about their nature continue to divide the scientific community (10 , 11 ) . Nevertheless, there is consensus on a number of key components that characterise emotions, and this paper attempts to view them in a computational light. We first provide a description of important features of emotions; then introduce valuation and the metareasoning problem; then relate approximate metareasoning strategies to features of emotions; and finally describe the control of approximate metareasoning strategies.
Ingredients of a computational approach to emotions
Key features of human emotions that require accounting for and that are emphasized to various degrees in different conceptualizations are a) correlated physiological, psychological and behavioural processes shaped by evolutionarily predefined neural circuitry; b) interpretations or appraisals; and c) conscious verbal self-report about emotions. Key problems in contemporary research on human emotions include to what extent the three feature domains are related (e.g. how conscious emotions in humans relate to evolutionarily predefined circuitry); and to what extent emotions are discrete entities.
Basic emotion theories suggest that there are a limited, relatively fixed, number of universal, evolutionarily-shaped, culture-independent and neurobiologically hard-coded emotional categories including happiness, surprise, sadness, disgust, anger and fear (12, 13, 11) . For the present purpose, what is important, is that these represent a set of innately interlinked physiological, behavioural, and psychological processes that are triggered in an inflexible manner by species-specific salient stimuli, akin to unconditioned responses. Animal work, where specific responses to species-relevant stimuli are observable and readily quantifiable, has contributed to this view. However, behavioural responses in animals cannot be directly translated to emotional experiences in humans. Amygdalar and hippocampal damage, for instance, abolish physiological and autobiographical signatures of aversive conditioning, respectively, while leaving the other intact (14) . Furthermore, aversive conditioning can be performed subliminally, evoke amygdala activity and physiological responses, but fail to result in any emotion of fear (15, 16) , while amygdalar lesions can leave human fear unaffected (17 , 18 ) .
Human emotional responses to stimuli are characterized by substantial within-and betweensubject variability. Appraisal theory locates one explanation for this variability (19) in the interpretation (be it conscious or unconscious) of a particular situation or stimulus as being M A N U S C R I P T
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relevant to the individual's goals. This interpretation depends on the goal, and the individual's beliefs in addition to the stimulus. A stimulus or situation being interpreted as increasing the changes of reaching one's goals would for instance result in the emotion of joy or happiness (20, 21, 22) . However, just like basic emotion theories, appraisal theories often view the expressed emotion itself as a "definable pattern of outputs that preexist within the individual" (10) . For instance, (23) defines them as "episode[s] of interrelated, synchronized changes in the states of all or most of […] organismic subsystems in response to the evaluation of an external or internal stimulus event as relevant to major concerns of the organism".
The evidence for discrete emotions is controversial. Autonomic responses, EEG features and facial expressions do not permit simple categorization and show little evidence of the predicted correlations (24, 10, 25) , though newer machine learning approaches have shown that categorical information can be extracted from physiological (26) and neural (27, 28) data. The latter analyses have, however, clarified that there is no single underlying substrate for particular emotions. Rather, each emotional category depends on a distributed network of limbic but also cortical components that reflect the particular neurocognitive processes involved (29 ) .
An alternative view is that the discreteness of emotions arises from the categorical labelling of internal events for the purpose of intra-or intersubject communication. Neuroimaging has provided some support for such a model, arguing that the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex is involved in categorical labelling of emotional states (30, 31, 32) evolving along the two major axes of valence (from good to bad) and arousal (from high to low). Indeed, factor analyses of a variety of measures of emotions including similarity ratings between words, facial expression and autonomic measures reliably identify these two separate dimensions (33) . Neuroimaging has also been used to argue that while the amygdala tracks arousal, the orbitofrontal cortex tracks valence across emotions (34 ).
Valuation and emotion
Basic and animal emotion research, with its grounding in evolutionarily shaped responses, emphasizes the importance of emotions in guiding behaviour adaptively. A focus on adaptive responding is also present in appraisal theories, which suggest that emotions arise when events are judged to be relevant to the individual's "needs, attachments, values, current goals and beliefs" (35) . Computationally, inferring adaptive choices involves integrating not only immediate, but also longer-term rewards, and for that reason requires consideration of the future course of events. This evaluation of the future is where the problem lies, as the further into the future one looks, the broader the range of potential events. Specifically, valuation involves summing over an exponentially expanding decision-tree of future possibilities. Optimal valuation would search the entire tree, which is rarely feasible. Reinforcement learning is a thriving subfield of machine learning concerned with algorithmic solutions to this problem.
Model-free accounts of emotional expression
A substantial body of work has related one such algorithmic solution to how emotional expressions change over time (36 ) . In so-called "model-free" reinforcement learning, the stability of the world is exploited to replace integration over the future with actual past experiences. Clever bookkeeping allows the use of prediction errors to update values that, in M A N U S C R I P T A C C E P T E D ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT the limit of extensive experience, are guaranteed to yield the true long-term values of states and behaviours (37) . Here, emotional responses are viewed as a type of high-level action, involving multiple biological and neural subsystems such as a freezing response, which has behavioural, attentional, physiological components. These high-level actions are emitted either in an innate fashion (38) in response to the appropriate species-specific unconditional stimulus (39, 40, 41) , or in response to a conditioned stimulus. In the latter case, the expression of the action is proportional to the value attached to the CS, which in turn is a scalar measure of the average expected unconditional stimulus strength (42, 1, 43) . This has been applied to a wide variety of affective responses, including heart rate changes (44) , approach (45) , avoidance (46 , 47) , extinction (48) , vigour (49, 50) and others. Perhaps the most striking success of these models is their ability to capture how Pavlovian affective responses can lead to maladaptive choices (51 , 42 ) .
Model-free approaches are very valuable to understand how the expression of affect transfers between situations with experience. Although mostly restricted to individual laboratory sessions, the underlying model likely plays an important role in explaining how individual differences in the expression of (affective) behaviours emerge over (life)time, and potentially in response to behavioural psychotherapeutic interventions. Furthermore, a hierarchical version of model-free reinforcement learning has the capacity to explain how complex highlevel actions consisting of multiple correlated processes might emerge (52, 53, 54) , but this has not been applied to the correlations between physiological, psychological and behavioural aspects of emotions.
Appraisals require model-based inference
However, pure model-free accounts fail to explain context effects on conditioning. For instance, the physiological response to a threat differs depending on whether the animal is restrained or freely moving (55), whether a refuge or obstacle is present and at what distance (56, 57, 58) and in humans framing the same movement as approach or withdrawal alters whether a Pavlovian CS promotes or inhibits it (1). Even startle reflexes are potentiated by fear induction (59 ) , enhanced by upregulating negative emotions (60) , and reduced by positive emotions (61) . More fundamentally, context determines what affective behaviour is emitted (62, 21) : The same emotion of anger might motivate harm through physical means in a boxing ring, but through financial transactions in a boardroom. Scalar summaries of past experience also cannot account for the impact of appraisals on human emotions. The appraisal of an event involves an assessment of what the event "means" (35) . This interpretative process determines whether and which emotion results by inference of latent causes: A smile is pleasant if interpreted as emanating from kindness, but aversive if viewed as an expression of condescension. That an event is meaningful can be inferred from changes in model-free values because these capture the expectation of future well-being in a relatively stable environment, and sudden changes in model-free expected values therefore indicate a meaningful event. This is reminiscent of the argument that changes in core affect invoke appraisals (33, 10) . Certain aspects of meaning might also be precomputed and result in automatic appraisals (63, 64) , but what an event or a behaviour mean for well-being cannot be derived from model-free values. This assessment involves a series of variables such as goal congruence, controllability and agency (65, 66, 35) that capture how the changed contingencies induced by the event and the behaviour influence the controllable achievability of the goal (67) . Goal congruence, for instance, measures how events influence the ability and cost of achieving current goals and as such involves
replanning a new path towards the goal and comparing the cost of this path to that of the previous plan.
The computation of the meaning part of the appraisal requires the integration of a model capturing an individual's beliefs about the consequences of choices, what reinforcements will be obtained in which states, how observations relate to hidden states, and how different states relate to each other (37, 68, 64) . Inferring such values requires a model to be inverted or simulated. Mirroring the notion that some appraisals rely on rule-based processes, it suggests a role for non-automatic components; captures that appraisals generalize and change over time as new information is progressively integrated; how maladaptive beliefs influence emotions; and how a new understanding can alter emotions in explicit reappraisal (62, 69, 65, 35, 70) .
However, a measured and "rational" consideration of all possible outcomes is hardly a sufficient model of emotions (71 ) . In fact, reasoning itself is profoundly affected by emotions (69) , as are perception, learning and memory.
Metareasoning
One factor that may be useful to consider is that model-based inference is mostly impossible due to the sheer size of most relevant model-based valuation problems. Figure 1A shows a simple planning task in a maze the solution of which corresponds to a binary decision-tree ( Figure 1B) . The best action at the root of the tree is the one which leads to the path with the best total outcome, and this may not be the action with the best immediate reward. As in reality, there is usually more than one way to the goal, but the different paths have different intermediate outcomes rendering some better than others. Despite its simplicity, humans have difficulty solving the task fully, and employ strategies to avoid evaluating the entire tree even when there are only 3 or 4 choices to go ( Figure 1C ). Unless they are highly constrained, such as in feedforward motor control (72) , optimal decisions in realistic situations are computationally extremely demanding.
The limited resources lead to the metareasoning problem, which concerns the optimal deployment of the available computational power (7, 73, 8, 74) . It is a decision problem about which of the various options to evaluate internally (Figure 2) . Formally, the estimated value of performing a computation is the difference in expected utility between taking a choice without the additional computation, and taking a new alternative choice after having invested in the computation (8) . Although this decision problem is mathematically similar to the original problem, it is different from the original problem because simulations do not actually incur the costs of the real problem, and while taking real poor actions should be avoided to avoid incurring their loss, internally simulating poor actions can be useful (75, 76) . Thus, the states in this metareasoning problem are all possible partial trees of the original tree, which is a far larger state space than in the original problem.
Emotions implement approximate metareasoning strategies
Model-based reasoning is hence faced with two profound challenges: the size of the problem; and the even harder task of apportioning limited resources in an adaptive manner. These are fundamental problems and a strategy to deal with them is mandatory. The proposal here is that emotions can implement approximate solutions to these challenges. In particular, emotional states come with a) a strong focus on particular behaviours and they b) induce a M A N U S C R I P T
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6 strong perceptual and processing focus such that evaluation is concentrated on a narrow set states. Emotions thereby effectively function as approximate metareasoning strategies that prescribe how computational resources are allocated. To what extent these approximations are adaptive depends on how they are invoked. We first provide an outline for the implementation in terms of action tendencies and state observations, and then turn to the control issues.
Action tendencies
One of the features of emotions about which there is more agreement is that they prioritize certain actions (13 , 77 , 35 , 78 , 79) . Constraining the action space can substantially simplify the valuation problem because the computational cost is exponential in the size of the action space.
At an abstract level, emotional states are accompanied by distinct and richly experienced urges towards particular classes of actions. (20) asked people to remember events of particular emotions, and then to rate a list or 26 items about the kinds of behaviours they wanted to engage in, such as "I gave up", "I wanted to protect myself from someone or something" or "I wanted to help someone, to take care of someone". From the ratings of these statements, the emotion characterising the episode could be reliably recovered. Though very abstract and, such rich descriptions are also important in psychotherapeutic settings. In dialectic behaviour therapy, individuals are initially taught to recognise emotions by the action tendencies they recognise (70 ) .
Emotions also induce physiological and vegetative changes. However, physiological signatures of emotions do not appear to readily differentiate between categorically defined emotions but rather provide a few classes of general action preparations ( (77, 80, 81, 82) ; though see (26) ). A preparatory increase in heart rate to compensate for the anticipated drop in peripheral resistance upon supplying blood to large muscle groups is required running be it when escaping or for fun. As such, these be seen as a preparation towards a class of behaviours that share physiological requirements.
State observation
The complexity of model-based evaluation is also exponential in the range of states considered. There is ample evidence for emotion-or mood-congruent processing biases (83, 84) . For instance, (85) showed that exposure to sad music and recollection of sad memories produces an attentional bias towards sad words, and such biases arise from the emotional state rather than purely from the exposure to the emotional word (86) . By restricting attention to particular states and disregarding others, the problem could again be reduced in size (87) , for instance by pruning (43 ) searches along branches of the decisiontree that result in states outside the attentional focus.
A further aspect is that there is usually uncertainty about the state. This profoundly complicates the computational task of valuation because policies for the various possible states have to be computed (88) . By ascertaining the state, this complexity can be reduced. Introspection about the state of the body likely plays a particularly important role: The impact of a muscle activation depends on the joint position and the chances of success in a fight are reduced when already wounded.
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Controlling metareasoning strategies
If there are multiple approximate metareasoning strategies, then there must be some control over which is deployed when. The first source of control is likely evolutionary, where species-specific responses provide a (potentially very strong) bias towards evaluating particular actions, rather than towards emitting the action entirely inflexibly. This allows for the kinds of context effects on even innate responses mentioned above.
The second source of control could be, confusingly, model-free. Performers might learn from experience that a certain amount of catastrophizing improves their performance (89) , without an understanding of why that is. (90) have recently argued for such a component in serial adaptations in the emotional conflict task, where individuals have to indicate the facial expression (fear or happy) of a face with either the matching or conflicting word superimposed over it (91 ) . Model-free learning has been argued to account for learning in strategy selection (92): with repeated experience, individuals can slowly increase their frequency of using adaptive strategies for solving problems (93 ) . We have recently shown how the results of costly model-based evaluations are memorised and simply replayed upon repeated encounter of the same problem in a process called memoization (54) that gives rise to decision-making biases that are characteristic of the individual but highly variable across the population.
The third evaluative process for emotions allows for knowledge to be incorporated in the form of heuristics. Research on decisions about options with many attributes (for instance cars, with price, speed, size, brand etc.; (94 )) have identified a host of different strategies. 'Take the best' is appropriate in non-compensatory environments where one feature is most informative and can be used alone to rank options. In compensatory environments, humans spend more time and cognitive effort on examining multiple features and integrating the information, but only if they are not under time pressure (95) . This suggests that individuals can access approximate measures of how adaptive a particular cognitive strategy is, and use this to guide their choice (96) . In the affective domain, misguided beliefs or schemas (97) about the adaptiveness of strategies relate to a number of pathological emotion regulation phenomena. Pathological worry in generalized anxiety disorders (98 , 99) and rumination in depressive disorders (100) are maintained by explicit beliefs about the usefulness of worry and rumination, respectively. People who dislike emotion regulation are more likely to respond with anger to provocation (101) . Depressed persons are not impaired at emotion regulation strategies such as positive imagery to improve their mood, but they have a reduced tendency to employ them (102 ).
The fourth evaluative process, again confusingly, could be model-based, where the precise consequences of particular emotions are examined and evaluated. This is rarely feasible and probably only commonly done in situational analyses in psychotherapy, where emotions, thoughts, behaviour and consequences are explicitly discussed (97, 103, 70) . This allows patients to learn to consciously and explicitly assess whether a particular emotion is appropriate and helpful in a given situation, and to adapt it by using reappraisal and other emotion regulation strategies if necessary.
Discussion
We have attempted to sketch out a valuation framework for emotions. We have argued why appraisals point towards model-based framework; how emotions might have a potentially Three desiderata for a computational framework of emotions were put forth. The first was the at best partially correlated nature of physiological, psychological and behavioural features. The flexibility the proposed framework allows for contrasts with the view of basic emotions as relatively fixed behavioural and physiological action packages. As such, it reflects the lack of identifiably discrete physiological or behavioural patterns or single neurobiological cause (24, 10, 29) . Similarly to other proposals, it emphasizes the importance of emotional processes in more complex decision-making settings (104) . Space constraints have prevented us from exploring the distinction between valence and arousal important to circumplex and core affect models, but this might naturally emerge from valuation in continuous-time settings, where the rate at which actions are emitted depends on the average reward rate in the environment albeit in sometimes complex ways (49 , 50 , 105 , 36) . Notably, the current proposal allows for mixed emotions through a combination of metareasoning policies.
The second desideratum was the ability to account for appraisal and contextual effects. The complexity of the model-based valuation required for this led to the notion of approximate metareasoning strategies. These approximate strategies are necessarily often suboptimal and may capture the prototypical adverse influences of emotion on cognition (106 ) . The focus on valuation is compatible with models emphasizing prediction (107) , but distinct in that it suggests that the relevant predictions must be about long-term utility; and that emotions play a key role in facilitating such predictions, albeit approximately.
The third desideratum concerned the nature of conscious qualia of emotions. Doing so fully awaits a theory of consciousness. However, two aspects are interesting to consider. First, (108)'s notion of a global workspace sits naturally with the notion of metareasoning. Situations with a high estimated value of computation should recruit neural resources more extensively, and hence be more likely to involve the brain-wide states postulated as representing the global workspace. Second, it has been suggested that the component processes in verbal self-report involve an interoceptive component followed by a classification process (30) . In our proposal, the metareasoning strategies would profoundly influence what information was processed, and as such may strongly determine future classification. Interestingly, the classification process has been suggested to involve the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (31, 32) , which is also known to mediate arbitration between valuation strategies (109 ).
The framework laid out here makes a number of testable predictions. First, the argument that appraisal involves model-based reasoning means that it should be influenced by cognitive, endocrine and neuromodulatory variables known to influence model-based reasoning (110, 111, 112, 113) . Second, we emphasized the importance of the control of metareasoning strategies, and suggested that it may be subject to substantial malleability. This in turn predicts that by training particular metareasoning strategies it should be possible to selectively facilitate certain emotions over others. Third, it suggests that emotions do not represent valuations themselves, but that they determine the process by which valuation occurs. This predicts an influence of emotion on search in a relevant model-based task rather than on values directly. The main challenge for the framework is that it points to the critical importance of understanding both the internal models of individuals, and their strategies in M A N U S C R I P T A C C E P T E D ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT searching them. Measuring these is a difficult scientific problem. Though this is as yet not feasible, recent advances including whole-brain mapping of semantic representations (114, 115 ) combined with active and passive sensing using mobile devices (116, 117) should open promising avenues.
The emphasis on model-based processes was partially motivated by the finding that modelfree measures of reward processing and learning are unimpaired in depression (118, 119) , and as such this work is an effort to start integrating cognitive phenomena of clinical importance like dysfunctional attitudes (120), helplessness (67) , attributional / cognitive styles (121, 122) and appraisals (35) into a valuation framework.
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